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GRANDPARENT VISITATION: THE PARENTAL
PRIVACY RIGHT TO RAISE THEIR "BUNDLE OF JOY"
MICHAEL J. MINERVA, JR.
T HE concept of a "bundle of sticks" is a familiar teaching tool in
first-year property courses. The phrase refers to the quantum of
ownership in a piece of property. The more sticks in a person's bun-
dle, the more rights of control that person has over the property. A
person with fee simple ownership has more sticks than a lessee, for
example.
Parents do not own their children in the same way that people own
property, but parents do have many legally cognizable rights vis-a-vis
their children. Courts at all levels have cited the first' and fourteenth 2
amendments to the United States Constitution, article I, section 23, of
the Florida Constitution, 3 and even natural law4 as sources of the right
of a parent to raise a child free from governmental interference.
Viewing parental rights as a bundle of sticks, any governmental
usurping of parental prerogatives removes some of the sticks from the
parents' bundle. Until recently, the state did not take any sticks away
from a fit parent. If one natural parent died, the whole bundle passed
to the surviving parent much like property held in tenancy by the en-
tireties. If the parents divorced, the state might be called upon to di-
vide the bundle, much like an action for partition, but again the
overall number of sticks remained the same.
The introduction of court-ordered grandparent visitation against
the wishes of the natural parent has fundamentally altered this
scheme. Under current Florida law, when one natural parent dies or
abandons a child, the state takes away some of the sticks and gives
them to the child's natural grandparents. Further, when the natural
parents divorce, both surrender some of the sticks to the child's natu-
ral grandparents. Thus, the grandparents receive sticks they never had
before the death or abandonment, or during their children's marriage.
In fact, as against the natural parents, these grandparents held no
rights in their grandchildren at all. Previously, only parental miscon-
duct, such as child abuse, worked a forfeiture of any of the sticks.
1. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
2. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-03 (1977).
3. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989).
4. State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1957).
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Now, on the basis of divorce from or death or abandonment by the
other parent, the state will transfer sticks away from an utterly blame-
less parent.
This Article examines the mechanism by which Florida courts take
some of the sticks of control away from single parents. The emphasis
is on the constitutional ramifications of governmental interference
with parental prerogatives in the absence of a showing that the parent
has harmed or will harm the child.' Whether courts analyze these
cases under common law rights of parents or under constitutional
rights of privacy, Florida's grandparent visitation law6 can achieve eq-
uitable results only if courts require the grandparent-petitioner to
prove that, on the facts of each particular case, visitation serves a
compelling state interest.
I. FLORIDA'S GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
A. The Statute and Its History
Before 1978, Florida law afforded grandparents no avenue through
which to seek the visitation of their grandchildren. 7 That year, the
Florida legislature amended Florida Statute section 61.13 to allow a
court to award visitation as part of a dissolution of marriage proceed-
ing. 8 However, the grandparents were not given legal standing to ap-
pear or intervene and were not required to be made parties. 9
Grandparents could also receive visitation privileges upon the death of
or desertion by one of the child's parents. 0 Grandparents seeking visi-
tation during a divorce proceeding or during an intact marriage of the
child's natural parents generally lost on issues of standing." Because
5. Excluded from the scope of this article are issues concerning: (1) the intricacies of the
effect of step-parent adoption on grandparent visitation; (2) the effect of any rights the children
might assert in these cases; and (3) any potential equal protection argument arising from the fact
that only natural parents who are not still married can be defendants.
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 752.01, .02, .07 (Supp. 1990).
7. See Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (an order is unjustified and
unenforceable if it grants visitation rights to a non-parent of a child whose custody has been
awarded to a fit parent); see also Tamargo v. Tamargo, 348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977),
superceded by statute as stated in Wishart v. Bates, 531 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 1633 (1989); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), superceded by
statute as stated in Wishart, 531 So. 2d 955.
8. Griss v. Griss, 526 So. 2d 697, 699 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (Pearson, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. Note, Grandparent Visitation: A Florida Focus, 41 U. FLA. L. REv. 179, 183 (1988).
11. Id. at 183-84 (citing Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)(grandparents
had no standing to petition for visitation, even during the course of divorce proceeding)); see
also Osteryoung v. Leibowitz, 371 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(no independent grant of
standing to grandparents for visitation absent dissolution proceeding).
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the statute did not otherwise confer standing to grandparents, they
could be awarded visitation only during a proceeding initiated by one
of the parties to the dissolution action, and if the trial judge granted
an award sua sponte. 2
In 1984 grandparents gained the right to seek visitation on their
own in certain situations. A court could grant visitation only upon
petition by the grandparent and after the death of one parent, aban-
donment by a parent, or upon dissolution of the parents' marriage. 3
The law also required the grandparent/petitioner to provide the par-
ents with notice of the action and a copy of the petition; and provided
that a step-parent adoption would not, by operation of law, destroy
rights awarded to a grandparent under the chapter. 4
B. The 1990 Amendments
In 1990 the legislature sought to overhaul chapter 752.'1 The 1990
amendments made a number of changes, probably the least important
of which was to make an award of visitation mandatory upon a find-
ing that it was in the best interests of the child. 16 Because the earlier
statute provided that a judge "may . . . award reasonable rights of
visitation" upon a finding of the child's best interests, 7 theoretically,
12. Note, supra note 10, at 185-86. This note discusses Putnal v. Putnal, 392 So. 2d 613
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981), in which the trial court ordered grandparent visitation pursuant to a modi-
fication proceeding initiated by the father. Because one of the contestants, rather than the
grandparents, initiated the action, the case presented no standing problems.
13. The operative section of FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1983 & Supp. 1984) provides:
(1) The court may, upon petition filed by a grandparent of a minor child, award rea-
sonable rights of visitation to the grandparent with respect to the child when it is in
the best interest of the minor child if:
(a) One or both parents of the child are deceased;
(b) The marriage of the parents of the child has been dissolved; or
(c) A parent of the child has deserted the child.
14. FLA. STAT. § 752.07 (Supp. 1984). The statute further provides that "the court may
determine that termination of such visitation rights is in the best interest of the child and rule
accordingly, after affording the grandparent an opportunity to be heard." Id. In Beard v. Ham-
ilton, 512 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), the Second District Court of Appeal held that the
grandparent's visitation petition could be heard as long as it was pending before the adoption
proceeding. A pre-existing order granting visitation was not required to gain such rights. The
court cited § 752.07, which preserves visitation rights when there is a subsequent adoption by the
step-parent. Id. at 1091. In addition, the court reasoned that there was a potentially short period
of time between a qualifying event such as death, dissolution, or abandonment and a step-parent
adoption, which contrasted with the potentially long judicial process involved to secure visitation
rights. Thus, it &ppears that the grandparent need only file a petition, rather then having to
secure visitation rights, before a step-parent adoption. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 193.
15. Ch. 90-273, §§ 6-8, 1990 FLA. LAws 1721 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 752.01, .015, .07).
16. See FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (Supp. 1990).
17. FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1) (Supp. 1984).
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a judge could refuse to award visitation even if he or she determined
that visitation would be in the child's best interests. Common sense
suggests, and case law supports, that no judge would choose such a
course of action. Thus, the "mandatory" amendment seems to do no
more than conform the statute to existing practice.
The situations under which a grandparent may seek a visitation
award were increased by the 1990 Florida Legislature. Under the old
law, a grandparent could petition for visitation only upon the death or
abandonment of a parent or the dissolution of the parents' marriage.18
Under the 1990 amendments, a grandparent may also petition if
"It]he minor child was born out of wedlock and not later determined
to be a child born within wedlock as provided in s. 742.091." 9
A second major change made in 1990 came in the form of a new
mechanism for resolving grandparent visitation disputes. The new sec-
tion 752.015 states a new public policy that favors internal resolution
of family disputes, as well as favoring mediation where such internal
channels fail. It instructs courts to refer newly filed petitions to medi-
ation services in accordance with rules promulgated by the Florida Su-
preme Court.20
Additionally, the statute now leaves the door open for grandparents
who could have been, but were not, granted visitation before a step-
parent adopted the child. Previously, a grandparent had to file a peti-
tion for visitation before a step-parent adoption. The new law seems
to require only that the grandparent could have filed a petition before
the adoption in order to seek visitation. 2' This new provision recog-
nizes that the time period between the qualifying event 22 and the step-
parent adoption can be short, and even a diligent grandparent might
not have had an opportunity to file this petition.
Finally, the Legislature cured one glaring defect by creating criteria
which courts must consider in grandparent visitation cases. These cri-
teria are as follows:
(a) The willingness of the grandparent or grandparents to encourage
a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents;
(b) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child
and the grandparent or grandparents;
18. FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (1) (1989).
19. Ch. 90-273, § 6, 1990 Fla. Laws 1721 (codified at F.A. STAT. § 752.07).
20. Ch. 90-273, § 7, 1990 Fla. Laws 1722 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 752.015).
21. See id.
22. These events include death, dissolution of marriage, abandonment, or a child born out
of wedlock. Id.
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(c) The preference of the child if the child is determined to be of
sufficient maturity to express a preference;
(d) The mental and physical health of the child;
(e) The mental and physical health of the grandparent or
grandparents;
(f) Such other factors as are necessary in the particular
circumstances. 23
Criterion (a) reflects legislative recognition of the importance of
preserving the authority of the parent. As one commentator has ob-
served, grandparent visitation suits can create an authority crisis-the
child becomes confused because parental authority has been
usurped32
Through subsections (d) and (e), the Legislature has instructed
courts not to award visitation, or at least to limit the award of visita-
tion, when the mental or physical health of either the child or the
grandparent would be adversely affected. It is unlikely that the Legis-
lature intended for each case to involve thorough inquiries into the
mental and physical well-being of the child and the grandparent. Most
of the issues under these two subsections will probably involve the ef-
fect of conditions on visitation brought about by the age or health of
the grandparent.
The length and quality of the relationship between the child and the
grandparent is the most significant criterion.25 In situations where the
two have a close relationship which the parent attempts to sever, the
state's interest in intervening and protecting the child is the strongest.
When there exists no relationship for the state to preserve, an award
of visitation not only contravenes parental authority, but does so with
little justification.
C. Court Interpretations of the "Best Interest Test" Under Chapter
752
Few challenges to the merits of an award of grandparent visitation
have reached the appellate level. To the extent the opinions provide
enough facts to allow meaningful analysis, these cases reveal a logical
trend: courts are more likely to award visitation where the child and
grandparent lived together, or otherwise had a close relationship. In
23. Ch. 90-273, § 6, 1990 Fla. Laws 1721 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 752.07).
24. Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objections of a Parent: The Best
Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAm. L. 51, 60 (citing J. GOLDSTEiN, A. FR uD & A. SouNr, BE-
YowN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 37-38 (1973) [hereinafter GOLDsTEIN]).
25. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 27-45.
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one case where the grandparent had essentially no relationship with
the child, the appellate court reversed a visitation award. 26 This pat-
tern reflects the overriding importance of the existence of strong and
meaningful relationship as a necessary precursor to any award of visi-
tation.
In the case of In re Guardianship of D.A. McW.,27 the grand-
mother, in conjunction with the natural mother, raised the child since
birth and the child had resided in the grandmother's home since
birth.2 The mother died in an automobile accident when the child was
two years old and both the father, who had never married the mother,
and the maternal grandparents sought custody. Because of the mater-
nal grandmother's prior relationship with the child, the trial court
awarded her custody. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed,
citing the overriding strength of natural parental rights.2 9 The Fourth
District suggested that, on the facts of this particular case, the grand-
mother should be granted "liberal visitation privileges," because
"[a]n abrupt and complete severance of the child's relationship with
his grandmother would obviously be detrimental to the welfare of the
child." 3 0
For similar reasons, the Third District Court of Appeal in Griss v.
Griss3' ordered the trial judge to expand the unduly severe limitations
placed on visitation. In Griss, the grandfather seeking visitation had
shot and killed the child's stepfather in an incident later dismissed by
a jury as an act of self-defense. The child and his mother had lived
with the grandfather at various times over a period of several years
before the shooting.32 Because the court failed to elaborate on the de-
tails of the visitation order or any evidence which indicated that visita-
tion was in the child's best interest, a factual analysis of this case is
nearly impossible.
In Sketo v. Brown,3  the First District Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded an extensive visitation award which approached the level of
a joint custody arrangement. Before the death of their father, the two
children had lived with both parents on the west coast from birth until
ages three years and fourteen months, respectively. During that time,
the grandparents had only "minimal contacts" with the children "and
26. Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
27. 429 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), aff'd, 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1984).
28. Id. at 702.
29. Id. at 704.
30. Id.
31. 526 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
32. Id. at 698.
33. 559 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
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[had] visited them only on rare occasions. 3 4 When the father died,
the mother and two children moved to Tallahassee, where the grand-
mother lived, and she visited with the children "on a few occa-
sions." 3 According to the court, the relationship between the mother
and grandmother "progressively deteriorated, and [the grandmother]
was allowed only limited visitation with the children. '"36
After a hearing, the trial court ordered weekly visitation, including
two hours on alternating Wednesdays and a consecutive 24 hour pe-
riod on alternating weekends, full (ten hour) days on the children's
birthdays and certain holidays, and one week in the summer.3 7 The
order also allowed the grandmother to travel with the children out of
town against the mother's wishes. The appellate court reversed the
trial court, holding that it was not "in the children's best interest that
the grandmother have the extensive visitation rights granted ... in the
• .. order." '3 8 Given its discussion of the limited contact between the
grandmother and the children, the court likely relied on this factor in
holding that the trial judge abused his discretion.
Finally, the opinion in Beard v. Hamilton39 did not even mention
the length or quality of the relationship between the grandparents and
the children. Such discussion would have been mere surplusage, how-
ever, because the Second District Court of Appeal did not apply the
"best interest" test. Instead, the court cited the fact that the parents
sought to avoid visitation as a factor in its decision to award visita-
tion. ° If the best interests of the child were the true touchstone, courts
would never use parental motives as a basis for their decisions.
The Beard court also misplaced the burden of proof. The court
found in favor of the grandparents in part because "there [was] no
compelling reason not to have grandparent's visitation in [this] ...
case" and because it was "obvious that the grandparents love[d] the
child of their deceased daughter." 4' Contrary to this analysis, the stat-
ute did not require the parent to advance a compelling reason to de-
feat visitation. Instead, the statute placed the burden on the
grandparent to prove that visitation was in the best interests of the
child. 42 However, the court in Beard presumed that visitation was in
34. Id. at 382-83.
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 512 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
40. Id. at 1091.
41. Id.
42. See FLA. STAT § 752.01 (1) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
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the best interests of the child and required the parents to prove other-
wise.
Essentially, the Beard court created a presumption in favor of
granting visitation. Following this analysis, courts could award visita-
tion merely because a grandparent aggressively pursued visitation, ex-
pressed love for the child, and the parent could not unearth a
compelling reason to deny visitation.
The new "prior relationship" criterion43 reduces the possibility that
courts will rule along the lines of Beard. Because of the new statutory
criteria, a court cannot perfunctorily award visitation without consid-
ering the quality of the existing relationship. Requiring the trial court
to examine this specific factor precludes an award of visitation justi-
fied only by the general belief that "[s]urely a child's welfare is pro-
moted in most cases by having grandparents, rather than by not
having them." 44 Had the Legislature so intended, it would not have
demanded an inquiry into the prior relationship as it expressly directs
in Section 752.01(2)(b), Florida Statutes.
The 1990 Legislature's rejection of Senate Bill 450, which would
have placed the burden of disproving best interest on the parent, also
argues against the Beard court's assertion.4 5 Even if the state does con-
clude that a child is better off by visiting with grandparents than by
not, it does not follow ineluctably that the state can substitute its
judgment for the parents absent proof that the parent's choice will
harm the child. 46 The state might also conclude that children who par-
ticipate in extra-curricular athletics develop socially better than chil-
dren who do not, but the state's authority to force such participation
over the objections of the parent is dubious at best.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The concept of a right to privacy, the notion that there are certain
realms of personal liberty where governmental regulation must be
strongly justified, originated in the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has
construed the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as pro-
tecting those personal interests which are "implicit in the concept of
43. FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (2) (b) (Supp. 1990).
44. Ramey v. Thomas, 483 So. 2d 747, 748 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 150-155, for a discussion of the major provisions of
this bill, which was introduced by Senator Karen Thurman (Dem., Orlando).
46. "For the state to delegate to the parents the authority to raise the child as the parents
see fit, except when the state thinks another choice would be better, is to give the parents no
authority at all." Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. FAm. L. 393, 441
(1985-86).
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ordered liberty." ' 47 One of the first rights to be recognized as funda-
mental was "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control. ,48
The Supreme Court announced this right in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters49 and based it on substantive due process principles which fed-
eral courts now recognize as the privacy right. As the Court explained
years later, "[a]Ithough '[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right of privacy,' the Court has recognized that one aspect of the
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment is 'a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy."' 50
Although the guarantee of a right to privacy in the United States
Constitution has been attacked by an increasingly conservative Su-
preme Court,5' Florida's state constitution seems to keep intact the
persuasive authority of federal cases which have recognized a strong
right of privacy. 2 Specifically, article I, section 23, of Florida's con-
stitution provides that "[e]very natural person has the right to be...
free from governmental intrusion into his private life. ... ."I
Because Florida voters adopted this amendment in 1980, well after
the United States Supreme Court decisions in Griswold v.
Connecticut4 and Roe v. Wade,55 the Florida Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the amendment encompasses, at a minimum, all privacy
rights protected by the United States Constitution under 1980 case
law.5 6 As a result, post-1980 federal cases cannot erode the floor of
privacy established in Florida by article I, section 23, even though
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 7 signaled a retreat from the
United States Supreme Court's previously vigorous protection of pri-
vacy rights. To illustrate the vitality of Florida's constitutional right
of privacy, the Florida Supreme Court in In re T. W. 8 stated:
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937)).
48. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
49. 268 U.S. 510.
50. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (quoting Roe, 410
U.S. at 152).
51. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
52. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23.
53. Id.
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
57. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
58. 551 So. 2d 1186.
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Article I, Section 23, [of the Florida Constitution] was intentionally
phrased in strong terms. The drafters of the amendment rejected the
use of the words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the
phrase "governmental intrusion" in order to make the privacy right
as strong as possible. Since the people of this state exercised their
prerogative and enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution
which expressly and succinctly provides for a strong right of privacy
not found in the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded
that the right is much broader in scope than that of the Federal
Constitution.59
Thus, federal cases that recognize a strong constitutional protection of
privacy merely serve to complement post-1980 Florida cases by defin-
ing the minimal level of protection allowable in Florida.
Florida and federal courts have recognized a privacy "interest in
avoiding public disclosure of personal matters," 6 and a "decision-
making or autonomy zone of privacy interests of the individual. ' 6'
The latter includes "matters concerning . . . family relationships and
child rearing." 62
The right of privacy, however, does not apply in all situations
where the state regulates or limits personal choice. "[B]efore the right
of privacy is attached and the delineated standard applied, a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy must exist. ' 63 Although no court, either
Florida or federal, has directly addressed the issue of whether a natu-
ral parent has a reasonable expectation that he or she can raise a child
without the state transferring the child into the temporary custody of
a grandparent," cases decided at all levels indicate that such an expec-
tation is reasonable. 65
Even if the parent can carry the burden of proving that such an
expectation is reasonable, the privacy right is not absolute and "will
yield to compelling governmental interests." 66 Because of the funda-
mental nature of the right of privacy, Florida applies the compelling
state interest test, which "shifts the burden of proof to the state to
59. Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544,
548 (Fla. 1985)).
60. Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 76 (Fla. 1983) (citations
omitted).
61. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (constitutional right exists in the
decision of a competent, adult, terminally ill patient to refuse or discontinue extraordinary medi-
cal treatment as it falls within the zone of protected personal autonomy).
62. Applicant, 443 So. 2d at 76.
63. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
64. Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
65. See cases cited supra note 69 and text accompanying notes 69-111.
66. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
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justify an intrusion on privacy. The burden can be met by demonstrat-
ing that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest
and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive
means."
67
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE CONTEXT OF GRANDPARENT VISI-
TATION
According to the Florida Supreme Court in In re T. W." and Win-
field v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,69 the Florida Constitution
encompasses all of the privacy rights recognized in federal cases-and
more. Two theories logically flow from this broad right of privacy
which a parent could assert to retain control over grandparent visita-
tion privileges. First, a parent has the right to raise a child free from
governmental interference as long as the parent is fit and the child is
not in danger of substantial harm.70 Second, the parent has the right
to define the family as he or she pleases, and not according to the
state's conception of what constitutes a "proper" family. Both of
these theories will be thoroughly examined in the following two sec-
tions.,
A. The Right to Raise a Child Free from Governmental Interference
The United States Supreme Court has recognized for most of this
century that the fourteenth amendment protects the right of a parent
to raise children without governmental interference.7 1 For example, in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,72 the Court struck down an Oregon statute
requiring all school-age children to attend public schools. The Court
stated that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. ' 73
The Pierce Court relied on Meyer v. Nebraska,7 4 decided two years
earlier, which recognized "the right of the individual to ... establish
67. Id.
68. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
69. 477 So. 2d 544.
70. Bean, supra note 46, at 449, concluded that "[s]o long as the alleged harm resulting
from the refusal of grandparent visitation is not discernible from a thorough examination of the
child's mental, physical, emotional and moral health," a court should refuse to order visitation.
71. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
72. 268 U.S. 510.
73. Id. at 535.
74. 262 U.S. 390.
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a home and bring up children.., as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." 75
In later decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut76 and Roe v.
Wade," the Court cast the right in terms of privacy. These were the
two most prominent in a line of cases concerning the right to decide
whether one should become a parent. 7 Although neither Pierce nor
Meyer mentioned any right of privacy, Griswold and its progeny cited
those cases as precedent for the Court's protection of certain personal
decisions. As one commentator noted, "Meyer and Pierce survived
the Court's retrenchment of due process principles, and the Court has
subsequently relied upon them to recognize, under the due process
clause, the parental right to raise children free from state interfer-
ence. "1
7 9
Privacy rights in Florida have followed a similar path. In early
cases, such as State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves,80 courts protected the
right of a parent to raise a child without interference. In Sparks, the
Florida Supreme Court asserted "that a parent has a natural God-
given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship and companionship
of his offspring. This is a rule older than the common law itself.''81
Since Sparks, Florida courts have jealously guarded "the right of a
parent, under natural law, to establish a home and bring up chil-
dren.... "82 The enactment of article I, section 23, cemented this
right in constitutional form.
Even since 1980, courts have on occasion upheld strong parental
rights without indicating a textual source. For example, in Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Straight, Inc. ,3 the First
District Court of Appeal discussed:
the long recognized right and duty of parents to train and educate
their minor children and to exercise such control and use such
disciplinary measures as will enable them to discharge their parental
duty. Parental authority in rearing children is not absolute and may
75. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
79. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Beyond the Supreme
Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 489 (1982).
80. 97 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1957).
81. Id. at 20 (citation omitted).
82. In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 429 So. 2d 699, 704 n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (cita-
tion omitted).
83. 497 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
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be limited by the state if that authority is exercised in an
unreasonable manner or is otherwise abused.Y
Although the First District did not mention the state constitution's
guarantee of privacy, the court did cite Lassiter v. Department of So-
cial Services,8 5 a federal privacy case, as support for the strength of
parental rights. The district court in Straight upheld the right of a par-
ent to place a minor child in a drug treatment program against the
minor child's wishes and without a court order. According to the
court, the statute authorizing a parent or other interested party to pe-
tition the circuit court for involuntary placement of a child in such a
program "does not in any way restrict the right of the parent to place
a minor child in a treatment program regardless of the minor's con-
sent if the-minor is either a drug abuser or drug dependent." 6
To date, In re T. W.87 is the most notable Florida case recognizing a
person's right to make child-rearing decisions without state interfer-
ence. Even though T.W. was a pregnant minor, the state constitu-
tion's right to privacy protected her decision not to bear a child. As a
result, the state high court struck down the law that would have re-
quired a pregnant minor to get permission from her parents before
obtaining an abortion. 8
The court in T. W. took notice of the "wide authority that the state
grants an unwed minor to make life-or-death decisions concerning
herself or an existing child." 89 As a result, article I, section 23, prohib-
its the state from forcing an unwed minor to seek parental permission
before terminating her pregnancy or consenting to medical treatment
for her child, and "this could include authority in certain circum-
stances to order life support discontinued for a minor child." 90
Given the broad rights that the state recognizes in minor parents, it
seems an unassailable proposition that a parent who has neither
abused, neglected, or abandoned a child must then have a reasonable
expectation that the state will not interfere with his or her decision to
limit a grandparent's access to the child.
Courts have relied on the existence of other intrusions as factors
reducing a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in a given situa-
84. Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
85. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
86. Straight, 497 So. 2d at 693.
87. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
88. This holding seems to comport with the level of privacy recognized in federal cases up
to 1980, which was noted by Chief Justice Ehrlich in his concurrence, as well as Justice Overton
and Justice Grimes in their concurring opinions. Id. at 1197, 1201, 1202.
89. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
90. Id. (citing In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)).
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tion. 91 The absence of such intrusions into parental decisions argues
strongly in favor of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy.
Most significantly, in no other situation will the state order a child to
leave a natural parent, absent abuse or neglect, unless such removal is
in favor of the other natural parent who asserts an equally strong
right. 9
2
B. The Right to Define a Family Without Governmental
Interference
Another facet of the right to privacy which a parent in this context
may assert is the right not to associate with the grandparent. As with
the child-rearing right, the parent asserting this right must demon-
strate the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
choice to define the family as he or she pleases.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,93 the Court explained that in
addition to the associational right expressly protected by the first
amendment, the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment
contains an implied right of association in close personal and family
relationships. 94 "[The] choices to enter into and maintain certain inti-
mate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by
the State." 95 Further, "[p]rotecting these relationships from unwar-
ranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently
to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty." 96
Finally, the Court stated, "[tihe personal affiliations that exemplify
these considerations . . . are those that attend the creation and suste-
91. In drug testing cases, for example, courts have looked to see if a person has already
agreed to certain other privacy invasions. If so, then a test for drugs seems to constitute only a
minimally greater intrusion. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) (consent to medical examinations in collective bargaining agreement
impliedly authorized routine drug testing); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing urine of Customs Service employees who were seeking promo-
tions into drug interdiction area was constitutional).
92. The state does not even force a child to attend school. The Florida Home Education
Act allows a parent to educate a child in the home. See FLA. STAT. § 228.041 (1989). Although
this statute has yet to be addressed in a constitutional context in Florida, the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), seems applicable. In Yoder,
the Court struck down a compulsory education law as violative of the first and fourteenth
amendment rights of the Amish. Yoder, however, seems to rest more on free exercise principles
than on any general right to raise children without government interference.
93. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
94. "Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967).
95. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
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nance of a family [including] . . . the raising and education of chil-
dren ... and cohabitation with one's relatives." 97
The United States Supreme Court also addressed the issue of associ-
ational privacy rights in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.98 In Moore,
a city zoning ordinance allowed only single family dwellings, and de-
fined the word "family" in such a narrow manner that it was a crime
for the plaintiff to live with her two sons and their two children. The
Court held that "the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from stan-
dardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns.'' 99 The opinion stressed the right to
decide what unit constitutes a family, and admonished the govern-
ment not to interfere with that decision.'°°
A parent fending off a grandparent visitation action might assert
that the right of associational privacy, recognized in Moore°1' and
Loving v. Virginia,'02 includes the right not to associate with a certain
person. However, neither Moore nor Loving, in which the Supreme
Court struck down a law prohibiting interracial marriage, directly
support such a proposition. The right protected in Moore and Loving
is the right to define one's family unit as he or she pleases, without
state interference. An award of grandparent visitation essentially re-
quires a parent to make the grandparent a part of the family, regard-
less of the parent's wishes.103 Although the grandparent can define his
or her family to include the grandchild, this right exists only as against
97. Id. at 619-20 (citations omitted).
98. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
99. Id. at 506.
100. Id. Not all persons who claim a right to associate with one another can fall under the
protection of the right to privacy. For example, in Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), a
Long Island city had enacted a zoning ordinance similar to the one struck down in Moore, 431
U.S. 494. However, there was one crucial difference. The East Cleveland ordinance was much
more restrictive than the Belle Terre ordinance.
In Moore, the ordinance narrowly defined "family" as those persons related to the head of
the household, essentially limiting it to the nuclear family group. 431 U.S. at 495 n.2. (quoting
full text of the ordinance). Conversely, the Belle Terre ordinance broadly defined "family" as
persons related by blood, adoption or marriage. 416 U.S. at 1. It was not broad enough, how-
ever, to encompass the six unrelated college students who lost their suit against the Belle Terre
ordinance. The Court properly dismissed the privacy theory without elaboration.
Similarly, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the Court denied associa-
tional privacy protection to the United Jaycees organization, who were equally undeserving of
rights recognized only in the area of close personal and family relationships. Mere casual or large
organizational relationships do not seem to qualify for greater privacy under this limited associa-
tional right.
101. 431 U.S. 494.
102. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
103. "[I]t is clear that determining with whom the child should not associate is necessary to
direct the development of the child." Bean, supra note 46, at 432.
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state interference, and must yield to the stronger right of the parent.' °4
C. The "Integrity of the Body" Issue
There are several key distinctions between the decision to terminate
a pregnancy and the decision to deny grandparent visitation. Unlike
the abortion decision, which the state constitution clearly protects, 05
the decision to limit visitation does not involve a governmental intru-
sion upon the integrity of the body. Also, unlike the abortion deci-
sion, the visitation decision does not involve the choice of whether a
person will have a child, a right that the Florida Constitution clearly
protects as well.106
A parent involved in grandparent visitation litigation does not as-
sert a right that affects the integrity of the body. Instead, the parent
asserts the right to raise a child and the right to define his or her fam-
ily without governmental interference. Because these rights do not af-
fect the integrity of the body, one could argue that they are not as
fundamental as the rights asserted in the abortion cases. Although
cases such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters'°7 and Meyer v. Nebraska'08
did not involve the integrity of the body, those cases implicated con-
stitutional rights other than the right of privacy.
The statute in Pierce made it illegal for a parent to send a child to
parochial school, and the Supreme Court ruled this proscription vio-
lated basic free exercise of religion notions.109 Likewise, the statute in
Meyer forbade the teaching of the German language, which under-
mined traditional free speech principles.110 The fact that the statute
providing a mechanism for ordering grandparent visitation neither af-
fects the integrity of the body nor implicates an independent constitu-
tional touchstone as did the statutes at issue in Pierce and Meyer
indicates that the expectation of privacy involved here is not as great
as in those cases."'
104. This issue will be more fully discussed infra text accompanying notes 112-36, in the
context of the state's interest.
105. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). The Florida Supreme Court unanimously de-
clared that a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester was a fundamen-
tal right protected by article I, section 23, of Florida's Constitution. Id. at 1192-93.
106. Id.; see also In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
107. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
108. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
109. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
110. Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. Interestingly, in neither case did the Court expound upon, or even
hint at the importance of, the separate constitutional considerations of the free speech and free
exercise clauses.
111. In neither Pierce nor Meyer did the Court explicitly engage in the burden-shifting analy-
sis which the Florida Supreme Court demanded in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wager-
ing, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
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The test for determining whether the privacy right attaches, how-
ever, is not how "strong" or "fundamental" one right is in relation
to another. The courts have instead looked to whether the constitu-
tional right asserted involves an area where the person has a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy." 2 According to the Florida Supreme
Court, once the constitutional right attaches through a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, the state must justify all intrusions with a com-
pelling state interest." 3 Because a parent has the reasonable
expectation that the state will not override the choice to limit a grand-
parent's access to the grandchild, the burden shifts to the party seek-
ing the intrusion to justify that intrusion." 4
IV. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN ORDERING GRANDPARENT VISITATION
As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, an intrusion into an
area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be
justified by the state." 5 The state bears the burden of proving that the
intrusion serves a compelling state interest."16 Because the state must
justify its interference by proving the existence of a compelling need,
Florida's constitution will allow such an interference only when ab-
stention would cause the child significant harm. This conclusion com-
ports with principles restraining state interference in abuse and neglect
cases, where the court will not abrogate parental rights absent clear
evidence of harm to the child." 7
As written, Section 752.01(2), Florida Statutes, requires courts to
base any grandparent visitation decision on the "best interests of the
child," a familiar but amorphous standard in family law. Florida
Statute chapter 61, regarding dissolution of marriage, defines that
phrase in the context of custody battles between parents,"" but most
of the defining criteria have no relevance in the grandparent visitation
context. The 1990 amendments will provide courts with greater guid-
ance and should steer the courts towards equating the "best interests
of the child" with a compelling state interest as required by the consti-
112. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test originated in the landmark case of Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), and has continued to be the
touchstone of privacy analysis.
113. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Winfield, 477 So. 2d 544.
114. Winfield, 477 at 547.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 145-5 1.
118. See, e.g., Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see also Osteryoung v.
Leibowitz, 371 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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tution. Such an approach would avert arbitrary and capricious intru-
sions on parental privacy.
In the grandparent visitation context, the state (or the grandparent
who is a party to the suit) could assert a variety of state interests that
court-ordered visitation would serve. As the state did in T. W., it
could claim that visitation serves to protect an immature minor and to
preserve the family unit."' 9 Although the Florida Supreme Court re-
jected these arguments in T. W.,' 20 each state interest must be consid-
ered with respect to the specific intrusion.
Arguably, the state in T. W. sought to protect the pregnant minor
from the burden of making the weighty decision of whether to have
an abortion. In the context of a grandparent visitation action, the
state seeks to protect the minor, but here the alleged harm stems from
not having a relationship with a grandparent due to parental interfer-
ence.' 2' This interference may be for cruel or vengeful reasons, or sim-
ply due to a sincere distrust of or dislike for the grandparent. In
Enslein v. Gere,'22 for example, the parent admitted that visitation
was in the child's best interests, but alleged that the grandparent had
petitioned the court despite the parent's willingness to allow visitation.
The dispute, he claimed, was over "the parameters of such.' 1 23 One
commentator has observed that "[b]ecause of the relatively comforta-
ble lifestyle of Florida grandparents, courts should be wary of situa-:
tions in which grandparents want to control their children's lives.'" 
2A
The same could be said for vengeful grandparents who file petitions in
retaliation against their children-in-laws. 25
Although the Florida constitution requires a compelling justifica-
tion for intrusions into areas in which a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, 26 the First District Court of Appeal in Sketo v.
Brown concluded that "[t]he state has a sufficiently compelling inter-
est in the welfare of children that it can provide for the continuation
119. T.W., 551 So. 2dat 1195.
120. Id.
121. See Griss, 526 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (quoting Fla. H.R., tape recording
of proceedings (April 23, 1984) (floor debate on H.B. 487) (tape available from the clerk of the
Florida House of Representatives)) ("[Tihis bill ... really is a children's visitation rights bill.
And I don't think we feel its fair to let spiteful parents in a particular case prevent their children
from seeing their grandparents.") (Representative's name omitted in Griss quotation).
122. 497 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
123. Id.
124. Note, supra note 10, at 208.
125. The parent in Enslein, 497 So. 2d 705, alleged that the "real purpose of the action was
to burden him financially." Id.
126. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 (Fla. 1989).
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of relations between children and their grandparents under reasonable
terms and conditions so long as that is in the children's interest.' 27
The mere conclusion that the state has a compelling interest in the
welfare of its children does not justify any intrusion into parental pri-
vacy. Under this analysis, the state can award grandparent visitation if
it believes that a child will be better off with, rather than without,
such visitation.121 As the Florida Supreme Court has indicated, when
the dispute is between a parent and a non-parent, the court must do
more than simply decide in which situation the child will be better
off. 29 Rather, the state must take into consideration the rights of the
parent and can usurp parental authority only when to do so serves a
compelling interest. 130
Consequently, the Sketo court's analysis merely pays lip service to
the compelling state interest test. It disregards the superiority of pa-
rental rights and treats the dispute as one between persons of equal
rights with respect to the children. According to the Sketo court, any
regulation asserting the welfare of children as its touchstone need only
be reasonable, rather than serving a compelling state interest. If this
assertion were sufficient to carry the state's burden, the Florida Su-
preme Court would not have struck down the parental consent law in
T. W.,13' in which the state attempted to justify its law by asserting a
compelling interest in the protection of immature minors.
In contrast to the First District's Sketo opinion, the Fourth Dis-
trict's analysis in In re Guardianship of D.A. MCW.3 2 reflects a pre-
cise understanding of the issues involved. First, despite the close
relationship between the child and the grandparent, the parent's natu-
ral rights require that he or she be given custody, absent evidence that
to do so would be affirmatively harmful to the child."' This reflects a
proper consideration of not only the best interests of the child, but
also the rights of the parent. 3 4 Second, despite the strength of a par-
ent's rights, if the evidence demonstrated a danger of substantial harm
to the child from not seeing the grandparent, then the state would
127. 559 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
128. Ramey v.Thomas, 483 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
129. In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1984).
130. Id.
131. 551 So. 2d 1186.
132. 429 So. 2d 699.
133. Id. at 703-04.
134. See also Behn v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), in which the First
District Court reversed a trial court's order awarding custody to the maternal grandmother
rather than to the father. In support of its decision, the appellate court cited the discussion in
State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1957), on the natural rights of parents to rear
their children. 345 So. 2d at 389.
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have enough of a compelling interest to override the parent's preroga-
tive.'3
On review of D.A. McW., the state supreme court praised the
Fourth District for its "thorough opinion," and because it "correctly
articulated the test to be applied in a custody dispute between two
natural parents and distinguished it from the test applicable to a cus-
tody dispute between a natural parent and a third party.' 1 36 Accord-
ing to the supreme court, granting the grandparent custody "would
permit improper governmental interference with the rights of natural
parents who are found fit to have custody of and raise their chil-
dren.' 1 37 Although not citing the state constitution, the court echoed
the "governmental interference" language of article I, section 23. 13
V. OTHER CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL ISSUES
In termination of parental rights and other similar cases, the courts
have demonstrated great deference to the wishes of natural parents.
Like many pre-Griswold United States Supreme Court decisions,
opinions in Florida cases have not cited the right to privacy as the
source of these parental rights. Instead, the courts have looked to fun-
damental, natural law principles. The characterization is not impor-
tant because the analysis under each approach has been virtually
identical. An examination of these cases demonstrates that even apart
from cases decided under article I, section 23, Florida has long re-
quired a standard similar to the compelling interest test before abro-
gating parental rights over children. 3 9
In Behn v. Timmons,14 the First District Court of Appeal reversed
a grant of custody to the maternal grandparent upon appeal by the
natural father. Citing, inter alia, Sparks, the court stated that in the
absence of a finding of unfitness on the part of the father, he must be
awarded custody. "[E]xcept in cases of clear, convincing and compel-
ling reasons to the contrary, a child's welfare is presumed to be best
served by care and custody by the natural parent.' 14 1 The court
reached its conclusion despite evidence that from May to October of
every year, the paternal grandparents would care for the children
seven days a week while the father worked cutting and baling hay.
135. 429 So. 2d 703-04.
136. In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 1984).
137. Id. at 370.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1957); see also Behn v.
Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
140. 345 So. 2d 388.
141. Id. at 389.
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The paternal grandparents were aged 60 and 85, respectively, and
were "not in the best of health.' ' 42 The maternal grandparents, con-
versely, were twenty years younger than their counterparts and lived
in a "larger . . . more attractive and cleaner" home. 143
In dissent, Judge Ervin apparently did not place any particular sig-
nificance on the fact that one party was a natural parent. The analysis
in the dissent is merely a comparison of the households and lifestyles
of the parties, much like in a custody battle between parents. The cor-
rect approach, approved by the supreme court in D.A. McW., is that
where two parents battle over custody, their rights cancel out, and the
court should only be guided by the best interests of the child. 1 In
contrast, however, where a non-parent contests a parent, "the rights
of the parent as well as the welfare of the child must be consid-
ered."1 45
In cases involving a potential termination of parental rights, Florida
courts have required clear and convincing evidence that termination is
in the child's best interests, such as in cases of abuse or neglect. 1' In
the case of In re W.D.N. 147 for example, although the court recog-
nized that "the right to the integrity of the family is among the most
fundamental rights,"' 1 the trial court's finding of child abuse justi-
fied an adjudication of dependency, which terminated parental rights.
The child abuse involved in W.D.N. was severe. The trial court
found that the parent had broken the ribs of a four-month old child,
inflicted at least ten bone fractures on a six-month-old child, received
past adjudications of dependency, and had no capacity to learn
proper parenting skills. 49 According to an expert witness, there was
"a high risk of additional child abuse if the children returned
home." 50
Although W.D.N. does not purport to represent the minimum find-
ings necessary to terminate parental rights, it is an example of the
kind of evidence necessary to override those strong rights. In Jones v.
A. W.,' 51 the Second District Court of Appeal reversed an adjudication
142. Id. at 390 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. 460 So. 2d 368, 369-70 (Fla. 1984).
145. Id.
146. In re Calnm, 294 So. 2d 318 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974); Jones v. A.W.,
519 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); In re W.D.N., 443 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Potvin
v. Keller, 299 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), aff'd, 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975).
147. 443 So. 2d 493.
148. Id. at 495 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 494-95.
150. Id. at495.
151. 519 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
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of dependency, despite a finding that the parents, who were ultimately
divorced, "have permitted the children to live in an environment
which caus[ed] the children's physical, mental, or emotional health to
be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly im-
paired. ' '5 2 The mother retained custody, it appeared, because of the
father's pattern of sexual abuse against the children, and despite her
role in the past problems.
The foregoing cases indicate that Florida's protection of parental
rights has the same origins as the right to privacy, even though the
decisions do not always cite this constitutional provision. Unlike the
above cases, the grandparent visitation situation does not involve the
loss of custody by a parent. Rather, an award of grandparent visita-
tion would deprive the parent of control only temporarily, and re-
move only some decisions from the scope of parental authority. Such
infringement might be characterized as only a de minimis interference
with parental rights. However, if construed as an intrusion of any
substance, the courts should apply the compelling state interest test to
visitation cases as well as to custody cases.
VI. THE FUTURE OF GRANDPARENT VISITATION
A number of issues remain on the horizon for grandparent visita-
tion in Florida. First, neither the legislature nor the appellate courts
have yet addressed the situation where a parent seeks to defeat visita-
tion because of hostility between the parent and the grandparent. Sec-
ond, the new situation in which a grandparent can petition for
visitation of children born out of wedlock differs so dramatically
from the other three situations where a parent dies or abandons a
child or the parent's marriage is dissolved as to require wholly differ-
ent justifications for intrusion by the state. Third, a number of pro-
posals surface each year during the session, which may foretell future
amendments.
A. Hostility Between the Parties as a Basis for Denying Visitation
One scenario not specifically addressed by either the 1990 amend-
ments or previous law arises when the parent makes disparaging com-
ments about the grandparent in an attempt to defeat visitation. A
parent might be so bitter about the situation that they refuse to en-
courage a good relationship between the child and the grandparent,
while avoiding affirmatively sabotaging it. The first criterion in Sec-
152. Id. at 1141-42 (quoting from order of trial court).
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tion 752.01(2)(a), Florida Statutes, takes into account the possibility
that the grandparent will respond in a similar fashion, and it seems to
indicate that this will weigh against visitation. It is possible, therefore,
that the legislature's omission of a similar provision for parental con-
duct indicates its desire not to so limit a parent's actions.
This issue has split both courts and commentators, and the 1990
amendments make the picture no clearer in Florida. On one side, a
number of prominent child psychology experts argue that placing chil-
dren in hostile situations is not in their best interests, and therefore,
visitation should be denied when this factor is present.'53 Some courts,
however, have refused to allow parents to "manipulate" the litigation
by fostering hatred towards the grandparent, then using that hostility
as basis for arguing against visitation. 5 4
This dilemma exposes the inherent flaw in grandparent visitation
statutes. Up until the time a grandparent seeks judicial intervention, a
parent is free to "manipulate" the statute by creating an atmosphere
hostile to the grandparent.' Even at that point, the ability of a court
to order the parent to act differently has yet to be established, and it
might be too late anyway. A court should not seek to punish the par-
ent by placing the child in a potentially traumatic situation.
If the "best interests of the child" standard truly guides the courts,
then two possible solutions present themselves where one or both par-
ties foster resentment toward the other party. First, the court can re-
fuse to award visitation, thereby immunizing the child from any harm
created by the conflict. Or secondly, the court can enjoin the parties
from engaging in the harmful conduct.
Granting or denying visitation is fully within the power of the
courts, so there is little controversy over the first possible solution.
The court's power to order the parties to foster good relations be-
tween the child and the other party is less than certain. The court does
have the authority to make such an order in a divorce case, at least
according to one Florida court. 56 In Schutz v. Schutz, the Third Dis-
trict Court determined that the first amendment does not prevent it
from ordering a divorced mother to foster in her children a loving
relationship towards their non-custodial father.'57
Schutz turned on the state's justification for limiting the exercise of
the first amendment right of free speech, rather than on privacy con-
153. See Note, supra note 24, at 60 (citing GOLDSTEIN, supra note 24).
154. See Beard v. Hamilton, 512 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
155. Note, supra note 24, at 61.
156. Schutz v. Schutz, 522 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
157. Id. at 875.
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cerns, but the result should be no different under a privacy analysis.
Because both natural parents assert an equally strong privacy right,
those rights cancel out and the court is free to do simply what it thinks
is best for the child.5 8 The parent cannot complain of state interfer-
ence with privacy rights, because the state is acting on behalf of a
person with an equally strong right. 59
In the grandparent visitation context, however, the rights of the two
parties are not equal. The parent has much stronger rights; in fact, as
against the parent, the grandparent has no constitutional rights. 6I The
legislature has chosen to deal with a grandparent who is not willing to
foster a loving relationship with the parent, but, even with full knowl-
edge of the Schutz'16 case, has remained silent on similar actions by a
parent. Ordering the parent to foster good relations with the grand-
parent implicates the parent's privacy right of child rearing, and the
strength of this right might call for a different result than was reached
in Schultz.
B. Visitation With A Child Born Out of Wedlock
Before 1990, a grandparent could petition for visitation only after
the death of a parent, abandonment of the child, or the divorce of the
parents. In each of these situations, the state could have recognized
that the child would be experiencing a potentially traumatic event and
tried to minimize the upheaval by preserving contact with a grandpar-
ent who could serve a stabilizing function.
A grandparent can now petition for visitation with a child born out
of wedlock. In this situation, the child has undergone no single trau-
matic event that visitation could alleviate. '62 This intrusion on parental
privacy rights cannot be uniformly justified on the basis of preserving
158. See In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 460 So. 2d at 370 (Fla. 1984).
159. See generally supra text accompanying notes 112-35. The strong language employed by
the Schutz court in chastising the custodial parent, as well as the importance the court placed on
the welfare of the child, indicates that the court believed it also had the power to restrain the
parent from making disparaging comments about a non-custodial grandparent. 522 So. 2d 874.
160. Although Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), established that the grandpar-
ent has the right to define his or her family without state interference, the Florida constitution
does not prevent invasions of privacy by private persons. Like the federal constitution, state
action is necessary to trigger any privacy protection. In this situation, a parent seeks to prevent
state (forced visitation) interference, and a grandparent seeks to prevent private (parental) inter-
ference. As a result, a grandparent would have no right of privacy vis-a-vis a parent.
161. 522 So.2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
162. Under pre-1990 law, section 752.01 (1) (a), Florida Statutes, would have provided an
avenue for visitation based on the status of the parents at the time of birth only in the unusual
event that a father had died or that the parents had divorced between the conception and birth of
a child. Nothing in the text of the statute indicates that the timing of the death or divorce would
have any effect on the right to petition.
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stability in the child's life. The children of never-married parents can
lead perfectly stable lives, notwithstanding the absence of a "tradi-
tional" family setting.
In the "child born out of wedlock" cases, the grandparent must
prove that the benefits of having a child exposed to the non-custodial
parents side of the family constitute a compelling interest which out-
weighs the parent's right of privacy. The difficulty of proof in such a
case is readily apparent.
C. The Legislative Horizon
The 1990 Legislature rejected a number of bills, the operative provi-
sions of which might resurface in subsequent sessions. A discussion of
Senate Bill 450 (1990), sponsored by Senator Karen Thurman,' 63 and
which contains some radical proposals, illuminates the possible future
of chapter 752.
Section 1 of Senate Bill 450 proposed reversing the current burden
of proof by requiring the parent to demonstrate that court-ordered
visitation would not serve the child's best interests. Currently the
grandparent has the burden to prove visitation would be in the child's
best interests.1' The proposed amendment, however, would require a
parent to justify why there should not be a governmental intrusion
into the realm of personal privacy. This runs counter to the constitu-
tional requirement that the state must justify any intrusion into per-
sonal privacy.' 65 Consequently, this provision probably would not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
As a practical matter, a reversal of the burden of proof would en-
courage parents to bring before the court as much damaging informa-
tion about the grandparent as possible in an effort to defeat visitation,
aggravating an already unpleasant conflict.'6 As pointed out by one
commentator, the average single parent in Florida has less available
funds than a grandparent in this state. 67 Requiring the parent, as a
defendant, to rebut the presumption in favor of grandparent visitation
would place an undue financial burden on already underfinanced par-
ents. '6
163. Dem., Orlando.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 112-35.
165. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d
1186 (Fla. 1989).
166. See Bean, supra note 46, at 442-45.
167. Note, supra note 10, at 207-08.
168. Courts could help cure this problem by awarding attorney's fees to parents who must
defend grandparent visitation actions. See generally Enslein v. Gere, 497 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1986).
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Section 3 of 1990 Senate Bill 450 proposed creating an inimical de-
vice apparently designed to force parents into financial submission.
The section called for mediation of these disputes, at the grandparent-
petitioner's request, with costs to be borne by the grandparent-peti-
tioner. The bill then provides that if, after the parent receives the writ-
ten request to mediate, "the parent fails to mediate in good faith, he
shall be responsible for the costs and attorney's fees of a grandparent
who is awarded greater visitation rights, in any subsequent legal ac-
tion to establish grandparent visitation rights, than had been allowed
by the parent."' 69
Therefore, once the parties reach mediation, only the parent has an
incentive to settle for it is the parent who must bear the risk of paying
costs and fees. This leaves the grandparent free to seek the most ex-
pensive legal counsel. Because the grandparent will have, on the aver-
age, a greater income than the parent,' 70 the party least able to pay
may be forced to bear the greatest cost. Thus, Senate Bill 450 would
have forced the parent to allow greater visitation or face the risk of
extreme legal expenses. It is not clear how imposing such a financial
burden on the child's household merely for the sake of grandparent
visitation would serve the best interests of the child.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state and federal constitutions preserve the long-recognized pa-
rental right to raise a child free from governmental interference. A
parent does not have the unqualified right to keep the entire bundle of
sticks that represent control of the rearing of a child. Just as it has in
all other circumstances, however, the state should take sticks from the
parental bundle only where the failure to do so will affirmatively
harm the child. The Legislature has taken great strides towards this
end by enacting criteria which will help prevent arbitrary and capri-
cious intrusions into the realm of parental rights. The courts must
take the next step, and apply these criteria in accordance with the
compelling state interest test under which the state must justify its in-
trusion into the parent's and child's life.
169. Fla. SB 450, § 3 (1990) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 7Z2.004 (2)).
170. Note, supra note 10, at 207 (In 1980, the average income for heads of households in
their "grandparent years" exceeded those in their child-rearing years by $4,000.00).
